audi Arabia:The volume & cost of printing the free books by Ministry of education

audi Arabia:The volume & cost of printing the free books by Ministry of education Current Situation: - Volume of books and expected volumes in the five years - Breakdown of costs (for each school category) and with expected increase in the future - What happens to these books after the end of the year (or semester) - The culture issue and the image left behind when people sees books thrown on streets (add some pictures) - Most importantly many schools books have the name of almighty ALLAH written in them - Environmental impact (number of trees needed for these books, .. etc) - Etc. For your Info, The ministry each semster print and distribute books free of charges to all students and schools . Econ 418, Fall 2015 Problem Set 5 Due Dec 5 (Sat) 2 pm Problem 1 (Basic) Represent as a game tree, the two-player extensive game with perfect information in which the terminal histories are (C, E), (C, F), (D, G), and (D, H), the player function is given by P(Ø)=1 and P(C)=P(D)=2, player 1 prefers (C, F) to (D, G) to (C, E) to (D, H), and player 2 prefers (D, G) to (C, F) to (D, H) to (C, E). Problem 2 (Advanced) The political figures Rosa and Ernesto have to choose either Berlin (B) or Havana (H) as the location for a party congress. They choose sequentially. A third person, Karl, determines who chooses first. Rosa prefers the outcome in which both she and Ernesto choose B to that in which they both choose H, and prefers this outcome to either of the ones in which she and Ernesto choose different actions; she is indifferent between these last two outcomes. Ernesto’s preferences differ from Rosa’s in that the roles of B and H are reversed. Karl’s preferences are the same as Ernesto’s. Model this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. Use the game tree format. Problem 3 (Basic-Advanced) a. What are the strategies of the players in the following entry game? b. What are Rosa’s strategies in Problem 2? Challenger In Out Incumbent Acquiesce Fight 2, 1 0, 0 1, 2 Problem 4 (Basic) a. Find the Nash equilibria for the game described in Problem 1. b. Find the Nash equilibria for the following game. Problem 5 (Advanced) For the following game: a. Write the normal form representation. b. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. c. Determine which of these Nash equilibria is subgame-perfect. 1 C D 2 E F 3, 1 2, 0 G H 1 1, 2 0, 0 2 1 Y Z 2 L R X 2, 2 L R 3, 1 0, 0 5, 0 0, 1